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Two theses: Time-driving desire is productive, not representational; Desire-driven 
world as a non-totalizing horizon explains something like psyche (and humanity), not vice-
versa. 
One double task: In an age in which the post-human, after long looming, is 
appearing, philosophy and ‘human’ sciences need each other in order to step toward 
temporal errantry in its post-human configuration; and to get able to have fruitful 
exchanges with arts. 
Several goals: to gain insight into how the pathologies of dead time – accurately 
described but poorly understood by psychiatry – can be traced back to the seizure of its 
errantry by the capital; into how its counter-seizure by the expropriated can take place in 
an age when fighters have to rally without any unifying identity (but that of 
underemployed); into how the productive erring of time can escape the numerous traps 
into the servitude volontaire set along the way of the so often rewritten psychic Formation 
Novel. The junction between philosophy, post-human sciences and arts is intended to 
write another time. 
 
 
Compulsion, phobia, anxiety, depression: a full row of descriptive tools of how time 
can turn deadly crooked is available since the age of phenomenological psychiatry at 
least, not to mention its well-known literary predecessors. Early phenomenological 
psychiatrist (E. Minkowsky, E. Straus, and L. Binswanger) engaged in rich descriptions of 
the wretched misadventures that time errancies often incur. Only, much needs to be said 
that completely escapes phenomenological psychiatry, namely the erratic nature of time as 
such, even outside its compulsive and depressive blockages; and, equally important, that 
the very move of circumscribing something like a psyche as the place where time is lived – 
and gets so ill-lived – is itself part of the whole story. Psychology is not innocent of what is 
being talked about. It can and must be showed that the very idea of psyche – together with 
the practices that flesh it out – is itself, quite uncannily, both similar and contributing to 
what underlies the pathologies it is designated to take into account – and care of. 
Human sciences and philosophy here need to step forth, each beyond itself, toward 
the other. As psyche stems from the very core of traditional western metaphysics, 
philosophy is now called to rework profoundly its own notions while interacting with human 
sciences, on the edge of the post-human. Which can but be post-psychic. 
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Psyche has nowadays got a technical implementation in the production cycle to 
which not only experimental psychology, cognitive sciences, AI, but also so many 
therapies, together with psychology-driven cultural industry, are bound to contribute. The 
challenge, then, is to think and re-frame the errancies of time, even those that seem so 
suitable to be incorporated into a psyche, without having recourse to the latter to explain 
them – quite the opposite! For the direction of explanation has to be reverted. However 
unpleasant rephrasing Margaret Thatcher may sound, there is no such thing as psyche – 
minus psychology bringing about one, no one will undergo it. Then, however, our 
challenge involves unseating psychology and its ‘treatment’ of time. 
One prominent reference for the interplay between philosophy and (post-)human 
sciences was itself authored by a philosopher and a psychiatrist: the Anti-Oedipus 
powerfully shakes, at once, both the metaphysical architecture (psychology, cosmology, 
theology) and the entire apparatus that makes it come true, at each stage of the Western 
history. In front of an entire world striving to put in place psychic subjects, the key move is 
to conceive of minds as broken though by the world; and of the world itself in terms of a 
«chaosmosis» (rather than as a kosmos). 
This move can open to understanding and experiencing in utterly different ways the 
time errancies described in pathological terms by psychiatry. Of course they are actually 
endured as pathologies by those on or around the cuckoo’s nest; however, flying over it 
requires to recognize in those errancies, so regimented, the urge of a psyche-free desire. 
Such a perspective reversal is itself two-sided: it can only take place on the 
condition of an epistemological turn by human sciences – one opening on their errant post-
human – but it also draws on, and aims to contribute to, the unsubmission of those whose 
lives are expropriated to temporalize them into a spotless unerrantry, with a little help from 
the psyche civil servants. 
 
This seems to be well-timed in a moment when so many indignados people are 
fighting against the expropriation of their lives. This expropriation is by no means 
unprecedented: more than one time capitalism had to destroy entire life-worlds in order to 
get a row human matter to work on and to put at work. Nowadays the disqualification of 
work, while destroying identities, does also provide a wretched one – rather ‘in dust’ than 
«liquid» – as an underemployed; which has far-reaching consequences on the way time is 
lived (which psychiatry does describe but scarcely insight into). Errancy is constantly under 
the threat of being seized by the capital. 
Underemployed, however, are reacting; are they attempting to counter-seize their 
lives for an uncrookedly erring time? Paolo Virno and Franco Berardi suggested this idea 
years ago with reference to the Italian “Autonomia”, which deserves to be worked out 
further. 
a) How time is in play in the fight over identities? How compulsions, depressions, 
anxieties are being induced by time expropriation? What can we learn from them in view of 
how that expropriation can be countered? Both Melville’s Bartleby and Kafka’s K. provide 
some clues. 
b) How to fight in an age when there is no unifying identity between all the members 
gathering together in the fight? Nor any precise identity is defined for each of them, let 
alone between them. At the very least: no identity – if any – is playing a role in making up 
and preserving their rally. So: What is it like to be a member of one, today? How can it 
succeed? 
c) Why does subjugation tend to occur again and again – up to the servitude 
volontaire? And: how can time turn unfit to be seized and taken advantage of by the 
capital? Here Deleuze and Guattari provide explanations of that subjugation of subjects 
that Michel Foucault carefully describes, namely the mechanisms of subjection, on the one 
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hand, and the resistance opposing them on the other. Deleuze and Guattari’s bold 
explanations are worth to be further developed; and forwarded to the fighters of today. Far 
beyond all Judith Butler styled analyses of the ‘Psychic Life of Power’ that hinge, à la 
Freud, precisely on the psyche, on the dynamics taking place first of all within individual 
mind, their suggestion is that psychology does need ‘cosmology’, but not vice versa. Minds 
are constitutively open to the world: their errancy is first of all a breakthrough by the world. 
While Butler recognizes that the subject is hailed, and thereby performatively formed, by 
an interpellation coming from outside, the direction of the explanation, nonetheless, 
remains fundamentally Freud’s, from the psyche to the (outer) world – whereas Deleuze-
Guattari’s suggestion is that psychology does need cosmology, but not vice versa. The 
world being always outer, no psyche can keep within. 
 
 
Two main theses (widely argued for in the Anti-Oedipus) are to be followed as 
directories throughout philosophy and sciences in the post-human: desire is productive 
rather than representative; it is the world that explains something like a psyche, not vice 
versa. Such two clues lead to investigate the worldly time as a multifarious net with open 
horizons where each entry – from whatever no-more-human science – is in principle 
suitable to connect away, allowing philosophy to construct local and though drifting 
concepts at each crossing point. The erring of time on the vanishing lines of a productive 
desire must be taken on by scientific and philosophical approaches to it so to make their 
exchanges fruitful, avoiding both the misconstrual of philosophy as a ‘representative’, 
leading epistemologist and the totemic meal by (too human) sciences with its (alleged) 
spoils. 
The two theses are in facts intertwined: desire, just because productive, does 
always perform in a cosmic network, in a world-sized chaosmosis. Inasmuch it is 
productive, desire is world, a strain of the world running its entire span long, rather than a 
psychic entity with its mental representations (maman et papa, of course). This 
‘antimentalism’, tracing back to Heidegger’s irreducibility of the world to any intra-worldly 
entity, including minds, also inherits from Sartre’s consciousness «exploding» toward the 
world: this explosion will become desiring production flowing all along the edge of the 
world as its moving and propelling limit. Deleuze and Guattari rework Heidegger’s idea that 
the world is the non-totalizing horizon of any entity, which has now become the moving 
limit of its own production. Being is world which is time, a no less productive than 
exploding becoming – such as desire can be. Desire, throughout the Anti-Oedipus, is the 
drive leading the production of the world – of no less than the world, far more than any 
item in it. Its objects are always partial, indeed, but this is just the way for the world to take 
place from one of them to the other. The world is as fragmented in partial objects as one 
as a limit to be pushed forward at each item of any productive series of entities. Thereby, 
desire is immanent to such a world as its moving horizon – moving because becoming, 
productive. By its excursion – painful as it may be – through them, desire is immanent to 
the field where they to take place or are “exploded toward”. Now such a field is nothing 
less than the world. 
Desire is immanent to the world as its becoming and propelling horizon. It is 
because of this involvement in the world that desire is not representative. To fulfil any 
representational task would be, for it, to fix on less than its own productive power leads it 
to – on entities; which is what Deleuze and Guattari call «opinion», the routinely death of 
thought. There is a tie – and a bond – between mentalism as to desire (understood as an 
attribute of a psyche) and the representational notion of it, according to which the desiring 
psyche represents its objects – so to put in place the theatrical representation of a scene 
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(desired as is being played). In facts, psyche – i.e. something, when anything, like a 
psyche – is indeed representational; only, desire is not psychic. 
How the post-human is being accessed to by arts and how can philosophy and 
post-human sciences take advantage of artists’ achievements? (And vice versa, maybe). 
How will they then handle such political issues as bio/temporal politics; ecology in 
the age of Gaia’s alleged allergy to biped parasites; time and space of migrants, of 
merchants, and of warlords? 
 
The political consequences of the ‘deconstrual’ of psychology require a manifesto 
for a secession from psyche within social life. Quite unsociable a sociality will ensue when 
the mouldering action by the authorised ‘psychists’ is eventually countered – and dropped 
by many. 
 
 
Appendix 
Greek Psykhé 
No Psyche Needed 
 
 
The dreary mythology of our time  
speaks of the subconscious or, what is even less lovely,  
of subconsciousness. The Greeks invoked the Muse... 
(J.L. Borges) 
  
  
  
From Homer to late Ancient Age: must the Greek psykhé really be understood in 
terms of modern psyche? Is psychology a suitable tool to understand the ways in which 
the Greeks, over centuries, thought and experienced feeling, thinking, willing, wishing? 
This can be doubted. No matter how different from each other these conceptions may 
be, they can and will all be showed to be recalcitrant to a psychological approach (be it 
Freud's or other). Scattered as they are in time and literary genres, the challenge is to 
grasp what, in each case, makes any approach of that kind unsuitable. 
We can experience this incompatibility whenever we try to rephrase what the Greeks 
said of mental life in terms of the properties and actions of something like a psyche as 
described by modern psychological theories. Of course one can (and some do) decree 
that whatever is said of mental life should be understood as referring to a psyche; and 
thereby replace the Greek psykhé with the latter. What is at issue, however, is whether we 
thereby miss the genuine content of the Greeks' conception(s) and experience(s) of the 
mental. 
While it would be hopeless (and beside the point, for that matter) to strive to attain a 
unified notion of psykhé – or even some positive continuity throughout the whole Greek 
civilization – it would be worth investigating the reasons why psychology is, anyway, no 
use here. This may possibly lead to discover a certain leading thread connecting the 
different Greek conceptions of psykhé, yelding a common feature shared by them. 
 
In short, two questions are being raised: 
 
1) Which notions of psykhé did the Greeks have? And: How – and to what extent – 
were they connected with each other? 
 
 27 
2) What does, in each case, make it so that a psychological approach to psykhé turns 
out to be unfit? Is there a common trait shared by those conceptions the reveals itself 
precisely in their common resistance to such an approach? Or else this resistance takes 
place each time for barely different reasons? 
 
Poets, physicians, philosophers, orators, were long investigated to make their 
respective notions of psykhé explicit: from Erwin Rhode through Bruno Snell, Jean-Pierre 
Vernant, Michel Foucault; more recently Jan Bremmer. On the second issue, however, the 
work must somehow start from zero.  
 
The final challenge will be to find one or more translations for the Greek word ‘psykhé’ 
dispensing from using it in italics (though not from mentioning it in quotation marks). 
 
(Berlin, End of January 2016) 
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